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Following the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), as 
well as similar critical events, a plethora of measures have been introduced in many Western 
democracies to prevent radicalization and violent extremism (PRVE). This has led to the 
emergence of a new field of policy and practices, which we refer to as the PRVE arena 
(Ellefsen & Jämte, forthcoming; Lindekilde, 2012a). Even if there are dissimilarities among 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Jan Jämte, Email: Jan.Jamte@oru.se, School of Humanities, Education and 
Social Sciences, Örebro University SE-701 82 Örebro, Sweden 
Abstract 
Policies to prevent radicalization and violent extremism (PRVE) frequently target 
a number of social movements seen as threats to national security. Often, this 
includes militant Islamist, right-wing and left-wing extremist milieus. In this 
article, we ask what distinguishes the ways in which local practitioners perceive 
and respond to these three milieus. Based on in-depth interviews with public 
servants in Sweden, we show how the milieus are seen to represent different types 
of threats, hold core values that resonate differently with dominant values in 
mainstream society and require responses that challenge public servants in 
diverging ways. Building on our analysis, we introduce a multidimensional model 
that clarifies why practitioners relate differently to each milieu. By including the 
rarely examined left-wing milieu, we are able to showcase the complexity of local 
PRVE work. Our study sheds new light on the challenges experienced by 
practitioners who are tasked to implement PRVE policy and demonstrates the 
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countries, the PRVE arena shares three interlocking characteristics: 1) a pre-emptive logic 
oriented towards forestalling extremist acts by identifying risk indicators and signs of 
radicalization in individuals or groups, 2) an outsourcing of state-based social control in that 
PRVE measures involve a wide range of actors in cross-sectoral collaboration, from the police 
and security services to civil society actors, schools, social services and public health 
institutions and 3) a pluralization of social control, evident in the expansion of the available 
repertoires used for PRVE, ranging from hard forms of repression, such as coercive control 
and incapacitation through imprisonment, to soft responses from actors outside the criminal 
justice system. 
  While initially developed to counteract international Islamist terrorism, contemporary 
PRVE measures have gradually come to impact a wide range of activists and social 
movements (Joyce, 2016). This is particularly evident for activist groups that are depicted as 
extremists and those that employ illegal or violent forms of action. The targeted milieus differ 
among countries but usually include militant Islamist extremism (MIE) and right-wing 
extremism (RWE), and in many cases left-wing extremism (LWE), as well as milieus and 
single-issue movements related to separatism, animal rights or environmentalism. In the 
PRVE policies of Western democracies, these milieus are often bundled together and referred 
to as “violent extremists.” Several national policy documents from European countries show 
that the concept of violent extremism is often used by policymakers to emphasize 
commonalities and downplay differences among the targeted milieus. The alleged 
commonalities often include aspects such as the activists’ opposition to democracy, the rule of 
law and individual liberty; the use of violence and illegal actions to further their goals; a 
“black-and-white” and intolerant worldview; an “avant-guardian” self-image and an 
antagonistic stance towards the police, media and representatives of institutionalized politics 
(Danish Government, 2014; HM Government, 2011; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 
2014; Ministry of the Interior, 2012; SOU, 2013:81; UN, 2015; Zeitbild Stiftung, 2012).  
The tendency to generalize about different milieus and bundle them as violent 
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Researchers have argued that the targeted milieus and groups are essentially different in 
regard to their internal dynamics, ideologies and practices. Research has also shown that 
commonly used indicators of radicalization are inadequate and misleading (Desmarais, 
Simons-Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling & Hoggan, 2017). According to critics, the measures 
needed to detect, prevent and counter different forms of extremism vary across milieus and 
socio-political contexts; there are no “one size fits all” or “off-the-shelf” methods in PRVE 
(Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016; Lööw, Poohl, & Mattsson, 
2013; Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros, 2019).  
Research and critical debate have, however, primarily attended to the global and 
national policy levels and the discourses surrounding radicalization and violent extremism 
(Andersson Malmros, 2019; Hardy, 2018; Schmid, 2013). The ways in which PRVE policy 
and concepts translate into local practice among frontline practitioners tasked with preventing 
extremism still remain an “ambitious, yet fundamentally important, empirical task for 
research in this field” (Andersson Malmros, 2019, p. 65; see also Johansson & Arvidsson, 
2016; Vermuelen, 2014). In this article, we present the results of a case study of how public 
servants in Sweden experience different types of extremism. In contrast to the uniform 
understanding of violent extremism often conveyed in policy documents, we seek to answer 
two questions: 1) What distinguishes the ways in which public servants perceive and respond 
to right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremist milieus? 2) How can these differences be 
conceptualized, in order to clarify why practitioners relate differently to each milieu?  
Our findings shed new light on the complexity of the local implementation of PRVE 
policy. We show how the three milieus are seen to differ in crucial respects: they represent 
different types of threats, hold core values that resonate differently with dominant values in 
mainstream society and require responses that challenge public servants in diverging ways. 
The results clearly illustrate how the enactment of PRVE policies depends on how they are 
interpreted, adapted and implemented by practitioners, and that a simplistic presentation in 
policy of the problem (i.e., radicalization and violent extremism) is unhelpful and misleading 
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This article proceeds with a brief review of the literature on PRVE policies and their 
implementation, followed by a presentation of the Swedish case. Thereafter we describe our 
data, methods and analytical approach. We then present our analysis, structured around 
differences in how local public servants perceive and respond to the three extremist milieus 
singled out in Swedish PRVE policy. In conclusion, we present a multidimensional model in 
order to clarify why practitioners relate differently to each milieu. 
 
PRVE: From National Policy to the Frontlines 
 
How we are to understand the root causes of radicalization and manifestations of violent 
extremism has been an issue of intense debate and divergent understandings within the 
scholarly literature on PRVE and counter-terrorism in the last fifteen years (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 
2018; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Scholars have failed to provide generalizable explanatory 
models and uniform answers to the question of why and how some individuals radicalize, 
enter and remain in (or leave) extremist milieus (Hardy, 2018), leading some to question the 
utility of radicalization research and PRVE policy altogether (Patel & German, 2015). This 
ambiguity is largely due to the fact that local variations and conditions have been shown to be 
decisive for the specific pathways through which people radicalize, which decreases the 
transferability of explanations across individuals, groups and localities (Christmann, 2012; 
Schmid, 2013).  
Scholarly disagreement also exists on the meaning of the concepts of “violent 
extremism” and “radicalization,” partly because the breadth of the academic literature 
drawing on these terms but also because there are fundamental disagreements about their 
definition (Neumann, 2013; Schmid, 2013; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018; Sedgwick, 2010). 
Research has also provided little insight into the actual outcomes of PRVE measures, and 
there is a lack of scientific knowledge and evaluation about their intended and unintended 
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forthcoming b). As Gielen (2019) argues, the scholarly community is not in a position to 
answer the question of “what works” in PRVE.  
Despite the fundamental ambiguities in this field of research, the ways in which 
radicalization and violent extremism are depicted in governmental policy documents are 
largely uniform (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). In policy documents, radicalization is 
frequently portrayed as a linear process through which individuals follow a “pathway” or 
climb a “staircase,” transforming from “ordinary” citizens to cognitively radicalized 
individuals, increasingly interacting with other extremists and thereby becoming further 
radicalized into a state where the individual might undertake a violent act (Lindekilde, 2012a, 
p. 337, 2016). Research has, however, shown that the relationship between extreme and 
radical attitudes and behavior is far from linear and that cognitive change does not necessarily 
lead to behavioral change (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). The reason why the radicalization 
discourse is still at the heart of PRVE policies is, according to Heath-Kelly (2017), that the 
idea of radicalization enables policymakers to render a linear narrative around the production 
of terrorism and thereby make terrorism amenable to problem-solving approaches and 
governance.  
According to this policy logic, the prevention of political violence is most effectively 
done by detecting, disrupting and reversing, or countering radicalization processes. How to 
detect individuals at risk of radicalization has, however, proved to be cumbersome (e.g., 
Desmarais, Simons-Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling & Hoggan, 2017). Policy documents often list 
a wide range of multi-causal and convergent risk factors and indicators of radicalization. This 
includes push and pull factors that either push individuals towards extremism (e.g., 
perceptions of injustice, fascination with violence, identity crisis) or pull them into extremism 
(e.g., sense of belonging, power and control, heroism). Another commonality is the emphasis 
on different risk and protective factors that either make individuals more resistant (e.g., 
supporting family, occupation, good health) or more vulnerable (e.g., poverty, social 
problems, sense of exclusion) to radicalization. Policy documents also frequently list signs 
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attributes or symbols) that can be used by frontline practitioners and others as possible 
indicators of radicalization (RAN, 2016; UN, 2015; see also Altier, Thoroughgood, Horgan, 
2014; Andersson Malmros, 2019; Horgan, 2009; Windisch et al., 2016). The wide range of 
indicators and risk factors are frequently described in general terms and as being similar 
across extremist groups.  
 
The transformation of national policy into local practice  
The discrepancy between the complexity identified in a vast amount of research and 
the tendency to simplify and generalize on the policy level creates challenges for public 
servants tasked with preventing radicalization and extremism in local communities. Many 
practitioners feel ill-equipped or uncertain about how to interpret and carry out their PRVE 
work (Ponsota, Autixierb, & Madriazac, 2018, p. 25), and the lack of tested practices in the 
field of radicalization prevention leaves them with very few best practices to draw upon 
(Ponsota et al., 2018, p. 24; see also Gielen, 2019; Hardy, 2019; Vidino & Brandon, 2012). 
Even though the local level is often portrayed as the “backbone” of PRVE work, it 
remains “highly understudied” (Vermuelen, 2014, p. 288). The research that does exist 
focuses mainly on local PRVE policy and shows how the uncertainty that surrounds PRVE 
work often translates into considerable variance across local policy documents concerning 
how radicalization and extremism are defined, presented and addressed (Andersson Malmros, 
2019; Van Helesum & Vermeulen, 2017). In local policy, the phenomena of extremism tend 
to be “decontextualized” and “radicalization and its root causes are portrayed as something 
that is not dependent on where it happens or in what milieu” (Andersson Malmros, 2019, p. 
57). Instead, the use of abstract definitions, theories, models and checklists are widespread 
(Andersson Malmros & Mattson, 2017; Lindekilde, 2012a).  
In this article we move beyond national and local policy documents and attend to how 
practitioners perceive and respond to different extremist milieus in their local settings. 
Frontline practitioners are often regarded as “invisible cogs in a prevention machine” (Ponsot 
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Scholars have examined frontline practitioners’ interpretation of central concepts (Mattsson, 
2018), challenges and dilemmas of certain professional groups like teachers, social workers 
and police (Haugstvedt, 2019; Mattsson & Säljö, 2018; McKendrick & Finch, 2017; 
O‘Donnell, 2016; Sjøen & Mattsson, 2020; van de Weert & Eijkman, 2018) or measures 
taken against a specific movement, group or milieu (Dudenhoefer, 2018; Hardy, 2019; Jämte 
& Ellefsen, 2020; Lynch, 2013; Mattsson & Johansson, 2018, 2019; Schclarek Mulinari, 
2019). Our intent with this article, however, is to take a holistic approach across professions 
and extremist milieus in order to scrutinize how the conceptualizations found in policy are 
being translated into local practice and what distinguishes the ways in which practitioners 
perceive and respond to right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremist milieus. In doing so, we 
hope to contribute to the literature on the relationship between PRVE policies and its related 
practices in general, and to the scholarship on local practitioners’ implementation of national 
PRVE policies in particular.  
 
The case of Sweden 
Our empirical locus in this article is Sweden, which serves as an example of the 
aforementioned characteristics of the PRVE arena, as well as the tendency to bundle different 
targeted milieus under the designation of “violent extremism.” Sweden has a long history of 
trying to control and counteract groups seen as subversive or as a threat to state security, 
primarily those belonging to the far right (fascists and Nazis) and radical left (communists) 
(Lööw, 2017; SOU, 2002, p. 91). By the late 2000s, radical Islamism was added to the list of 
extremist milieus in Sweden, alongside the designation “violence-affirming extremism” 
(SÄPO 2010). The use of the term “violence-affirming,” rather than just “violent,” signals 
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involved in politically motivated violence but also those who express positive attitudes 
towards it or support it.2 
In 2011, the Swedish government launched a National action plan for safeguarding 
democracy against violent extremism (Skr. 2011/12:44). This was followed by an official 
commission of inquiry in 2013 that formulated ideas and aims to prevent extremism more 
efficiently (SOU, 2013:81). As a result of the commission, a “national coordinator to 
safeguard democracy against violent extremism” was appointed in 2014 (Committee 
Directive, 2014:103) with the responsibility to develop, strengthen and coordinate national 
and local work against violent extremism.3 Since then, a number of policy documents have 
been produced, inquiries set up, evaluations undertaken and legislation passed, and research 
shows that frontline practitioners often experience “some confusion” about what policy 
actually governs the field in Sweden (Sivenbring & Andersson Malmros, 2019, p. 29–30). All 
of Sweden’s 290 municipalities have been under institutional pressure to develop local action 
plans since 2015, and research shows that 134 had done so in 2017. However, the majority of 
these local plans (N=104) are not based on local threat assessments but reflect the general 
descriptions and security threat assessments issued by national actors (Andersson Malmros & 
Mattsson, 2017, p. 65).  
The national and local action plans reflect the pre-emptive logic of the PRVE arena as 
it seeks to identify and intervene early against individuals at risk, preventing them from 
becoming radicalized. Further, the action plans mirror the tendency to outsource state-based 
social control in its instruction to a wide range of local professions, such as police, educators, 
social service, youth workers and actors within civil society, to collaborate in efforts to 
recognize and deter radicalization, counteract extremism and encourage disengagement from 
targeted movement milieus (Committee Directive, 2014:103; Sivenbring & Andersson, 2019; 
 
2 Although sporadically used in parliamentary documents and debates since 1996, the designation “violence-
affirming extremism” did not reach broad salience before 2010, following several (failed) terrorist attacks in 
Sweden by militant Islamists (Wahlström, 2018).  
3 In 2018, the task of coordinating these efforts nationally was overtaken by The Swedish Centre for Preventing 
Violent Extremism (CVE), placed under the governance of BRÅ (the Swedish National Council for Crime 
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Skr, 2014/15:144). This has led to a pluralization of social control, ranging from coercive 
tactics that push people out of their engagement, to soft and pull-oriented forms of control, 
including the labeling of certain groups as violent extremists (Jämte & Ellefsen, 2020). In 
government publications and those of the national coordinator in Sweden, three distinct 
movement milieus are singled out, what is often referred to as “Islamist extremism” (militant 
Islamist extremism, MIE) “the autonomous milieu” (left-wing extremism, LWE) and the 
“white supremacist milieu” (right-wing extremism, RWE) in Sweden (Brå & Säpo, 2009; Skr. 
2011/12:44; SOU, 2016:92). These are the three milieus we investigate with regard to 
practitioners’ local efforts. Like that of other European countries, Swedish policy and 
governmental reports emphasize the commonalities of different extremist milieus across 
ideologies and groupings and lay out a joint strategy to counteract them (Andersson, 2018, p. 
155; Johansson & Arvidsson, 2016). 
 
Methods, Data and Analysis 
 
This article is based on semi-structured interviews with 26 public servants involved in 
preventing radicalization and violent extremism.4 The interviewees are primarily frontline 
practitioners: teachers/educators (N=8), social workers (N=6), police (N=4), as well as 
coordinators of the local activities countering violent extremism (N=4). We also interviewed 
national representatives from each profession working at the strategic level (N=4). All 26 
public servants have in different ways interpreted or implemented policy in their given 
context. Interviews were carried out in four cities. All four cities have documented challenges 
 
4 The interviews were carried out as part of to two research projects: “Radicalization and De-radicalization”, 
supported by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and the project “Collaboration and conflict in prevention 
of violent extremism in Sweden”, funded by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working life and 
Welfare. Several researchers have been involved in doing interviews, and we would like to thank Magnus 
Wennerhag and Mattias Wahlström for their contributions. We would also like to thank Kalle Eriksson for the 
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with violent extremism5, and have worked to develop distinct internal structures to implement 
PRVE measures. 
The interviewees were chosen using two factors; 1) their key position in relation to 
PRVE work (i.e., they were local coordinators of work countering violent extremism or a 
national or regional representative of a profession tasked to interpret PRVE policy) or 2) their 
role as a frontline practitioner (i.e., tasked with the responsibility of implementing PRVE 
policy). Most interviewees were approached through national or local structures for PRVE 
work. Some were approached through a chain sampling technique, where one person pointed 
to others, while some were accessed using the researchers’ existing professional networks. 
Most interviews were carried out individually (N=18) and lasted from one and a half to three 
hours. Two interviews were organized as focus groups, in which a total of seven teachers took 
part to reflect on how they implemented their work in the prevention of radicalization and 
extremism. Prior to the interviews, respondents received information about the purpose of the 
research projects, that their participation is voluntary and that they have the right to withdraw, 
after which we asked for oral consent for their participation in the research project. To ensure 
the confidentiality of the interviewees, names, localities and specificities regarding their work 
position have been anonymized. The interviews focused on several broad themes concerning 
PRVE work, and in relation to this article we have focused on the data concerning 1) their 
perception of the different milieus, 2) the measures they took, and 3) the challenges and 
possibilities they experienced in preventive work vis-a-vis the different milieus. Research on 
local Swedish PRVE work indicates that different professions (e.g., social workers, teachers 
and police) can have different experiences and perceptions of the three milieus, dependent on 
their available measures to counteract extremism and entry points into the milieus (Johansson 
& Arvidsson, 2016). Our aim in this article, however, is to seek out patterns concerning how 
practitioners perceive and respond to each of the three extremist milieus, independently of 
practitioners’ profession. 
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The interviews were carried out between 2016 and 2018, and the empirical data 
reflects the practitioners’ perceptions of the milieus at the time of the interviews. In this 
period, violent extremism was vigorously debated in Swedish society, especially in relation to 
foreign fighters and Islamist extremism. This is reflected in the interview material, as many 
practitioners tried to make sense of these developments. The local prevalence and long history 
of measures taken against the far-right was also a repeated reference point for many 
interviewees. To make comparisons across the three targeted milieus possible, we paid special 
attention in the interviews to the practitioners’ views of PRVE work in relation to the radical 
left. This is a neglected topic in research on PRVE (see Jämte & Ellefsen, 2020; Jämte & 
Wennerhag, 2019; Wennerhag & Eriksson, 2018; Windisch, Ligon & Simi, 2017 for notable 
exceptions), and by focusing on this milieu we highlighted an important point against which 
the other two milieus could be compared. 
The transcribed interviews were coded and analyzed using Nvivo, following the 
principle of inductive thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is an approach to identify, analyze 
and report patterns (themes) found in empirical data, which can be applied across theoretical 
and epistemological approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2008, p. 78). Our application of this 
method involved identifying the parts of the interview transcripts germane to our main 
empirical questions concerning practitioners’ perceptions of and responses to the different 
milieus. In relation to these two broad areas, codes were created, refined and combined, 
resulting in the gradual identification of subthemes. With regard to differences in perception, 
we focused the analysis on the practitioners’ understanding of each milieu, scrutinizing if and 
how the milieus were perceived as threats, and if so, to what or whom, and why. With regard 
to differences in responses, we focused the analysis on the type of measures used, the 
practitioners’ aims and the challenges they encountered. We used the resulting structure of 
themes and subthemes as a guide for reporting our findings below.6 
 
6 The quotes used in this article have been translated from Swedish to English by the authors. We have made 
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Differing Perceptions and Responses to Right-Wing, Left-Wing and Islamist Extremism  
 
Our analysis provides an aggregated picture of how practitioners experience differences 
between the three extremist milieus. First, we lay out two sections on the practitioners’ 
perceptions of the milieus, as they are seen to differ in the threats they represent, and their 
core values. This is followed by a section on differences in practitioners’ responses, in 
particular the challenges they experienced in relation to each milieu. 
 
The different milieus as different threats 
In this section we highlight differences in how local practitioners perceived the type 
and level of threat associated with the extremist milieus. By type of threat we refer to the 
forms of political violence used by each milieu, and by level of threat we mean the extent and 
intensity of activity. Our analysis shows that local practitioners balance two main influences 
when they assess the threats associated with each milieu: 1) national PRVE policy and extra-
local prioritizations and 2) their own local experiences and situation. The interviewees often 
experienced these influences as conflicting, creating an ambivalence regarding how they 
should assess the threat of each milieu. 
 
Extra-local prioritizations 
The interviewees described their efforts to prevent radicalization and violent 
extremism as regulated and influenced by a range of extra-local sources. Referring to national 
policy, interviewees described a formal mandate to address all types of extremism and to 
remain objective in relation to “different threats” and “challenges to democracy.” At the same 
time, practitioners often experienced extra-local pressure to prioritize certain milieus over 
others, which affected the focus of their local work. According to the interviewees, their 
primary focus was directed at MIE, less at RWE, and almost none at LWE. This ranking was 
influenced by a range of sources: national and international risk assessments, educational 
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extremism. An example of the different emphasis on each milieu comes from Anna, a social 
worker who had taken part in several educational efforts to address radicalization and violent 
extremism. She described an obvious imbalance in the attention given to the three milieus, 
both locally and nationally: 
Jihadism has probably taken 90 % of the space. [...] The left, maybe 1 % ... or at least 
very little, I shouldn't exaggerate. I’m trying to think of the last [national] conference, 
how much talk was there about the left? I can't think of one single seminar [...]. 
 
The practitioners often explained the dominant focus on militant Islamists in relation 
to contemporary societal developments, primarily the occurrence of terrorist attacks in 
Sweden and internationally, as well as the phenomena of foreign fighters departing to and 
returning from Syria. According to the interviewees, these developments had created 
widespread fear of terrorism and a general emphasis on MIE, which affected what type of 
PRVE work was seen as most urgent. Johan, a policeman working with educational efforts on 
PRVE, described how the threats associated with the milieus were a reflection of national 
threat assessment and the current fear of terrorist attacks. 
 
Now and then I read on our Intrapolis [internal police registry] [...]. To be honest it is 
only issues related to Islamism that are connected to terrorism [...]. When we talk 
about threat assessments it’s only Islamism, never white supremacists [RWE] or the 
autonomous milieu [LWE]. So, in relation to each other, there is a ranking, some are 
ranked higher than others. 
 
Local experiences 
In interviews with local practitioners, the extra-local priority of militant Islamists was 
often contrasted with the local prevalence of other types of extremism, in particular RWE. 
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indeed described as a recurring problem. But even in these locales, RWE was often 
considered a more pressing and prevalent issue. For instance, Mikael, a social worker working 
with PRVE in one of the municipalities that have had a high number of foreign fighters, said: 
 
The greatest concern we have in Sweden is not related to jihadism. If we are to talk 
about an internal democratic crisis or domestic challenges related to the violence 
affirming extremist milieus, then it is the right-wing extremists that constitute a much 
bigger threat, and a much greater problem.  
 
The quotation above describes a situation similar to that of many local threat 
assessments. In a survey of the local prevalence of extremist groups in Swedish 
municipalities, 51 municipalities out of 290 stated that violent extremists were active in the 
local environment: 41 identified RWE, 30 MIE and 12 LWE (Nationella samordnaren, 2016). 
Similar patterns can be found in other evaluations (Andersson Malmros & Mattson, 2017; 
Sivenbring, 2018, Nationella samordnaren, 2017). While far-right extremism is considered a 
more widespread phenomenon locally, the threat of militant Islamism was primarily seen as 
connected to certain areas of larger cities (cf. CVE, 2020a, 2020c). In the interviews, the 
radical left was rarely considered an issue at all, and not seen as a prevalent threat in local 
settings (see also Jämte & Wennerhag, 2019; MUCF, 2017; Sivenbring, 2018). According to 
Linda, a municipal employee working to prevent and counter extremism, the discrepancy 
between the overwhelming focus on Islamist extremism and the local presence of RWE often 
led to a cognitive dissonance about local priorities:  
It creates a rather great cognitive dissonance; that the fear is about one thing [MIE], 
while in practice it is the white power milieu [RWE] that is the primary concern for 
many [municipalities] [...]. We have public servants with protected personal data 
because they are being threatened by the right-wing extremist milieu. And that is a 
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institutions [...]. Compare it to a bomb exploding somewhere. That is obviously also a 
threat, but they work in very different ways. One [MIE] represents a very acute 
situation, the other [RWE] is more low-intensity terror. 
 
Types of threats 
As expressed in several of the quotations above, the milieus were seen to represent 
different types of threats. MIE was primarily described as a sporadic, indiscriminate and 
“invisible” threat, connected to few, albeit horrific, terror attacks targeting civilians. In 
contrast, RWE was often seen as an ongoing, visible threat, primarily responsible for violence 
and hate crimes targeting specific groups, as well as challenging local democratic institutions 
in the form of threats and confrontational behavior against local politicians and civil servants 
(on- and offline). Karin, who interprets and implements PRVE policy for social workers, 
illustrated the different perceptions people have of the two milieus: 
Right-wing extremism is perhaps more distinct [...]. They [...] want to stand in public 
spaces and proclaim their message. They [...] go after politicians, being threatening, 
pushy and unpleasant, like… aggressive. While violent Islamists, they operate in 
silence and just strike.  
The third milieu (LWE) was primarily seen by the practitioners as being a threat 
described in policy, but rarely noticed or experienced as such at the local level (see also Jämte 
& Wennerhag, 2019). When mentioned, LWE was mainly connected to property damage, 
targeted actions against opponents and turbulent counter-demonstrations, primarily against the 
far right. Several practitioners, however, referenced higher levels and severer types of left-
wing violence in the 1990s and early 2000s, and contrasted this to the current situation where 
they rarely observed any left-wing violence. Like the other interviewees, Anna had never had 
(or heard about) any PRVE case concerning LWE, which she understood as a result of the 
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I have never had one [a case or call of concern]. And I have never heard that any of 
the others have received calls concerning the left, actually. I don't think people believe 
that: “here comes a left-wing activist who is going to blow up a school”, which is what 
some think about a jihadist [...]. You don’t think the same “terror-thoughts” [in 
relation to LWE], so there’s not the same level of concern. 
 
The different threats associated with each milieu also reflect in calls from the general 
public to the national hotline (Orostelefonen), which was established in 2017 to provide 
advice on issues related to extremism. Between February 2017 and May 2018, 154 calls were 
received. Fifty-three concerning general questions on extremism, 62 on religious extremism, 
36 on RWE and three on LWE (Sivenbring, 2018, p. 26). 
The discrepancy between how policy documents present the milieus as equally 
important, external pressure to prioritize certain milieus and the local prevalence of different 
extremist groups made some interviewees question the way the concept of “violence-
affirming extremism” was presented in policy. Some questioned the inclusion of all three 
milieus under the same umbrella, while others described the inclusion of all three milieus in 
policy as an effort to “mask” the fact that MIE was the primary focus of Swedish PRVE 
measures. The other two milieus were often “downplayed” (primarily RWE) or only included 
to make policy “remain neutral” (primarily LWE). An example of this comes from Olof, a 
policeman working with PRVE measures: 
 
Do you want me to be totally honest? When it comes to the work of the [national] 
coordinator, it feels like they have brought in a bit of the right, and a bit of the left as 
an excuse to talk about what everyone has been most afraid of [MIE]. [...] We have 
[worked with] the white power [RWE] and autonomous milieus [LWE] before, and 
there was no coordinator for that. [...] Suddenly we added a milieu [MIE] that 
everyone wanted to talk about, but then it became politically incorrect to do so. So 
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In sum, the three milieus were described as markedly different in the type of threat 
they represented, ranging from sporadic and indiscriminate terrorism and mass violence 
against civilian targets (MIE), to hate crimes and threats to local democratic institutions 
(RWE), to property damage, counter-demonstrations and disturbance of the public order 
(LWE). For many of the practitioners, the experienced level of threat associated with RWE 
often came into conflict with extra-local prioritizations and expectations of working primarily 
on MIE. This created discord for some practitioners, as they felt pushed into carrying out a 
mission in which they did not fully believe in or feel aligned with.   
 
The differing core values of the milieus 
The practitioners differed markedly in their views about the core values of LWE, 
RWE and MIE milieus. In this section we analyze practitioners’ descriptions of to what extent 
these values are seen to resonate with dominant values in Swedish society, as they saw them. 
We also show how the degree of affinity or distance between societal norms and the milieus’ 
values affect the social stigma attached to each milieu.  
From our analysis, it is clear that the practitioners experience differences between the 
core values of each milieu, and that these differences affected their view of the milieus. Many 
practitioners were understanding and sympathetic to the values of the radical left, but 
condemned their use of illegal or violent protest tactics. In relation to the radical right, some 
interviewees understood their line of thought, but were distinctly antipathetic towards their 
core values. The greatest lack of understanding and antipathy was voiced about the values of 
Islamist extremists. A quote from Dan, a local coordinator, is illustrative of how several 
practitioners distinguish between the milieus’ core values:  
 
In some ways, it is the equal value of all that the left-wing movements proclaim, and it 
is more sympathetic than a black-and-white worldview, even if it also is in a sense, 
when they cross the line and use violence... To me, it’s a bit different, I am not really 
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speech like it does when I hear someone from the right... it really gives me the chills. 
[...] And I believe that those who are given the absolute least amount of space in 
society, now I am bantering a bit, but that’s the Muslims [MIE].  
 
Similar to the pattern described above, the analysis shows that the practitioners 
position the milieus differently in relation to what they considered to be mainstream values in 
Sweden. According to several interviewees, the militant Islamist milieu represented the 
biggest clash with mainstream values, followed by those of RWE. Numerous practitioners 
talked about how the core values of the LWE were more aligned with those of the wider 
society. The values they associated with LWE were rather described as radicalized 
mainstream values, and thus seen as more legitimate in a liberal democracy (see also 
Nationella Samordnaren, 2015). According to the practitioners, this was also why LWE was 
less marginalized by the general public, compared to the other milieus. As Karin, a social 
worker, said: 
 
There is another type of tolerance for left-wing extremism, like: “Ok, you were young 
and radical and spray-painted fur shops and smashed windows”. People might think 
that it was foolish and criminal, but the person would not be stigmatized for the rest of 
their life, generally in society. But, if you say: “Yeah, I traveled to Syria and joined 
ISIS because I liked their methods and tried to establish a Caliphate” - that would be 
very much stigmatized. 
 
Our analysis makes it apparent that the difference between the experienced core values 
of the milieus and mainstream values was seen as decisive for the degree of social exclusion 
and marginalization activists faced in wider society. While the interviewees expected that 
members of MIE and RWE milieus would be heavily stigmatized, LWE activists were 
seemingly much less so. It was noted by some interviewees, however, that values previously 
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Sweden, as well as in other European countries. According to the practitioners, this meant that 
people from RWE milieus did not necessarily face the same level of rejection and exclusion 
by the general public as they had ten to twenty years ago (c.f. Linden & Klandermans, 2006).  
In sum, the analysis shows clear differences in how interviewees describe the core 
values of each milieu and situate them differently in relation to what is seen as dominant 
values in Swedish society. Regarding LWE, the use of violence was the crucial problem for 
participants, not the values themselves. For the other two milieus, however, both values and 
practices were seen as problematic and dangerous. These perceived differences, 
independently of how accurate the perceptions were, are important because they are likely to 
affect practitioners’ understanding of the potential for counter-responses to the milieus, which 
we attend to in a subsequent section. It is also evident that the level of social stigma attached 
to involvement in the three milieus situates them along a continuum of closeness and distance 
to what are considered mainstream Swedish values. This is, however, contingent and may 
change over time. A milieu’s position on this continuum is also likely to be indicative of the 
degree of challenge of reintegrating persons who seek to exit that milieu (see following 
section). 
 
The different challenges of responding to the milieus 
In this section we attend to the challenges practitioners experienced when responding 
to the three milieus. We have identified three areas where the milieus clearly differ from each 
other: 1) the potential for exit and re-integration, 2) the entry points for preventive measures, 
and 3) the signs of radicalization.  
 
Exit and re-integration 
Practitioners pointed to three areas in regard to exit measures and assisting people to 
leave extremist milieus and re-integrate into mainstream society (see Hansen & Lid, 2020; 
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of internal sanctions for defecting, the degree of social stigma activists faced when exiting and 
the availability of exit programs.  
A recurring theme in the interviews was the risk that activists faced when attempting 
to leave the milieus. According to the practitioners, leaving militant left groups rarely 
involved threats from fellow activists, and organizations seldom dictated whether or how a 
member could leave. The extreme right and militant Islamist groups carried out much more 
stringent sanctions, which often involved personal risk and major life and social changes for 
those wanting to leave. According to interviewees, the degree of intra-movement sanctions 
also affected the general public’s view of each milieu. Chris, working with PRVE in local 
authorities and regions, elaborated on this point:  
 
One thing that separates left-wing extremism is the degree of social acceptance the day 
someone wants to leave. It’s not like they need to turn to Fryshuset [Swedish exit 
project] in order to defect. They can, rather, just stop. […] Milieus that you are not 
allowed to leave [RWE and MIE]… and traditional criminal milieus as well [...], their 
participants cannot leave unpunished. I think that makes people perceive them as more 
dangerous; social acceptance is more limited for milieus that you cannot leave 
voluntarily. 
 
According to the practitioners, the degree of social acceptance or stigma also affected 
the activists’ possibilities for re-integration. Given the experience and views of practitioners, 
exit and re-integration were often unproblematic for activists from LWE milieus, but more 
difficult for RWEs and most challenging for MIEs. In line with what was said about the 
discrepancy between core values of the milieus and dominant societal norms, many 
interviewees emphasized that it was easier for LWEs, in comparison with RWEs and MIEs, to 
re-integrate and pursue a “normal” life after exiting, partly because the threshold for their 
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The interviewees also emphasized the uneven availability of exit programs. In relation 
to RWE, practitioners frequently referred to the Swedish Fryshuset, a foundation that has been 
assisting right-wing extremists to alter their life course for more than three decades (Mattsson, 
2018). With regards to MIEs, practitioners more often connected the possibility of exiting to 
traditional social work, by targeting individuals, their social networks and the communities 
they lived in (e.g., Lindekilde, 2016). The interviewees offered no examples of the far-left, 
and exit measures were neither described as a priority nor a necessity. Many former left-wing 
militants were seen to retain their values and political engagement, but adopting more 
conventional forms and institutional channels for protest and politics as they aged.  
For some interviewees, the availability and necessity of exit programs was also 
connected to the type of transformation deemed necessary for a person’s de-radicalization, 
whether this transformation involved behavior, beliefs, or both. Dan, a local coordinator: 
 
When it comes to right-wing extremism and exit projects they usually leave their 
ideology behind, they cut. They don’t just disengage from violent criminal behavior, 
but they also rethink things, they are helped to do so, or do it on their own. [...] You 
come to see the world in a more nuanced way. In relation to the left-wing, is it like 
that? What would the change be there? And with religious... [extremism]? [...] Many 
of those who are easily recruited to these types of movements have a really shallow 
understanding from the beginning, and a deepened understanding rather adds nuances. 
So,[...] one can leave it [religion] behind as well, but one can also make it more 
nuanced and deeper, maybe become even more religious than before leaving for Syria.  
 
In sum, the necessity for exit strategies was seen to be heavily affected by internal 
movement characteristics, such as the degree of sanction meted out to those who sought to 
defect, and also societal factors, like the degree of social stigma activists faced when 
attempting to change their life course. Also, the need for and availability of exit programs 
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seems more dependent on conventional social work. In relation to LWE, exit work was not 
deemed necessary and the practitioners did not know of any exit programs for this milieu. 
 
Entry points into the milieus 
The employment of preventive measures presupposes the presence of “entry points,” 
or “access points,” to individuals at risk of radicalization or those already engaged in 
extremist milieus. Our analysis shows that practitioners encountered different social 
characteristics and personal biographies of those engaged in each milieu, differences that 
affected how, why and on what grounds the practitioners came in contact with these 
individuals.  
Interviewees described individuals engaged in RWE or MIE as often having a range of 
interconnected social problems, from social exclusion and mental illness, to drug abuse and 
criminal behaviour, to living in socially and economically deprived communities. These social 
problems sometimes opened avenues for personal contact, either initiated by the police or 
social services, or by the targeted individuals themselves in search of help or services from 
local agencies. Practitioners gained entry into the lives of targeted individuals through the 
services they provided, making it possible for them to address, directly or indirectly, the (risk 
of) affiliation with extremist milieus. Establishing such entry points was also important in 
order to obtain more information about the person and for engaging in multi-agency 
collaborations and measures to both monitor and assist the individual in question (Ellefsen, 
forthcoming a). Olof, a police officer, described the disparate social biographies and problems 
he observed in his work:  
 
When we were dealing with individuals [from RWE], at least those who were the 
furthest out, those that weren’t the real idealists, they were quite broken. They had 
witnessed violence, or experienced violence while growing up, perhaps even drug 
abuse within the family. They were often drunk when they committed certain acts [...] 
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[...]; it often occurs in suburban areas where drugs are close at hand; there is 
criminality; there are concerns for the family [...] often several public agencies are 
present. Usually, there is an entry-point through something; public employment 
programs or things like that. Regarding the autonomous milieu [LWE], lastly, it’s the 
most challenging, because it's more socially accepted.  
 
As hinted at in the quotation above, the interviewees rarely see entry points in relation 
to LWE. Persons affiliated with LWE were generally described as coming from the middle or 
upper class, as being more educated, socially connected, well off economically, as well as 
living in stable communities, which often left front-line practitioners with few or no 
accessible entry points (cf. Rostami et. al, 2018; CVE, 2020b). For instance, teachers we 
interviewed reported that they rarely had access points for PRVE work with students 
sympathizing with or engaging in the radical left as their views seldom contradicted the 
curriculum. As Henry expressed it: 
 
Regarding [LWE] I haven’t really observed that much, I would say. It is a group I 
have seen very little of [...], at least that I know of. And that goes for every school I 
have worked in. When we are discussing values that are further to the left, I often 
think - when there are strong opinions - it’s usually [...] about solidarity; that we need 
more solidarity. I rarely think it ends up on an extremist level; that we need to revolt; 
that we need to fundamentally change things. It is, rather; this is missing in society, or 
we need more of this. I experience it as more challenging [with LWE], I don’t know 
what signs [of violent extremism] to look for.   
 
The police officers we interviewed provided more descriptions of interactions with 
LWE activists, in particular in relation to street protests. However, according to the officers, 
the leaderless and non-hierarchical nature of organizations and activists’ reluctance to 






Jämte & Ellefsen. Countering extremism(s): Differences in local prevention of left-wing, 








ISSN: 2363-9849          
dialogue with LWE groups. Some police interviewees described the RWE milieu as easier to 
work with, given its tendency to have clearer structures and identifiable leaders. MIE groups 
were rarely seen to organize street protests in Sweden, and therefore this arena did not exist as 
an entry point. For those suspected of associating with MIE, however, police and other 
practitioners mentioned mosques and imams as entry points, as were indirect and personal 
contacts. 
In sum, the views of practitioners underlined ways in which the social vulnerabilities 
of participants in the three milieus differed, more often allowing for entry points into the 
RWE and MIE milieus but not into LWE (cf. CVE, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d). For the 
police, interaction with the LWE milieu mainly takes place in relation to street protests, but 
this arena seldom offers stable entry points into the milieu for police. For other professions, 
such as social workers and teachers, there seems to be an experienced lack of access points for 
PRVE work with LWE. 
 
Signs of radicalization and risk indicators 
Risk indicators and signs of radicalization are frequently listed in policy documents as 
tools for identifying individuals that might be at risk of radicalization. Our analysis shows a 
general skepticism among practitioners about actively using such signs as a guide to action 
because that implies perceiving expression of ideas, use of symbols or behaviors that often are 
legal, as indicators of potential radicalization or support for violent extremism. Few 
practitioners referred directly to the different risk indicators that were featured in the 
checklists of policy documents. When practitioners did talk about how they understood 
extremism and signs of radicalization, many emphasized the difficulty in pinpointing when an 
expression or behavior should be considered extremism, except actions that were clearly 
illegal or violent. Many of the interviewees were also clear that people had a right to hold 
radical opinions without risking being the subject of political surveillance and monitoring. 
  When practitioners did mention possible signs of radicalization, they distinguished 
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signs, symbols or expressions, given that they fell under the category of “hate speech” against 
ethnic groups. Also, there is a long tradition in Sweden of identifying RWE activists based on 
sub-cultural attributes and well-known symbols (e.g., swastika, certain runes or number 
combinations), which still lingers. This said, some interviewees recognized that it had become 
increasingly difficult to detect these symbols even within RWE. As Karl, a local coordinator 
said: 
There are certain symbols, but it is so abstract. It doesn’t help me. If someone walks 
around in that [a specific type of] extremely expensive jacket, it can mean that they are 
well off and likes that jacket, but it can also mean that they are ideologically affiliated 
with SD [The Sweden democrats, a Swedish political party]. It can’t be used in that 
way. And one can’t use runes any longer either. And the bomber jackets that everyone 
wears these days, that was the uniform for the skinheads in the 1990s. [...] It has lost 
its value as a symbol. 
In comparison, it was harder for practitioners to assess whether a symbol signaled 
support for MIE, partially because of language barriers and limited knowledge of Islam and 
MIE groups in Sweden and internationally. Additionally, militant Islamists and foreign 
fighters were, at the time of the interviews, a relatively “new” phenomena, making the lack of 
knowledge even more acute. For example, interviewees described how a banner with the 
Arabic shahada (Muslim declaration of faith) was mistaken for support for Islamist terrorist 
groups. The practitioners reported even less knowledge of LWE, both regarding the milieu in 
general, but also specific groups. They also lacked the knowledge to recognize signs that 
would indicate the need for intervention. According to interviewees, even the four far-left 
groups that have been singled out specifically by the national coordinator as violent extremists 
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The autonomous left [LWE] [...], is the group that is hardest to make sense of [to 
others]; what it’s about and why it´s included amongst the three milieus. I mean, most 
people can connect right-wing extremists and Nazis to the Second World War, and 
Islamist extremists with Paris or Brussels [terrorist attacks]. [...] But, the autonomous 
left is more challenging to make sensible. Maybe that is also because I think it’s hard 
to understand myself. It sprawls in many directions and involves very different things. 
Then there are groups like Rev-front [Revolutionary Front] and AFA [Anti-Fascist 
Action], but, if we mention AFA when we are out [meeting practitioners], almost no 
one knows what it stands for.  
 
In sum, practitioners expressed varied knowledge of the three milieus, where the 
challenge of identifying signals connected to MIE and the lack of knowledge on LWE stand 
out as particularly evident.7 There is also an underlying ambivalence in the way in which the 
practitioners monitored and assessed signs of radicalization across milieus. On one hand, they 
were frustrated and critical of engaging with a system where people were monitored or 
reported for expressing lawful, albeit controversial, opinions. On the other hand, practitioners 
clearly did monitor and assess people’s speech and opinions as part of a broader alertness to 
identify potential radicalization and engagement in extremist groups. The practitioners, 
however, seem much more inclined to react to views, signs and indicators associated with 






7 A potential limitation in our data is raised by the lack of knowledge many practitioners voiced about MIE and 
LWE. Lack of knowledge can influence practitioners' ability to identify and report on extremist activities, as well 
as impact their general perception of the threat associated with each milieu (see e.g. Koehler & Fiebig, 2019). To 
balance this, we have included references to several studies and reports from the same time period that function 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our study presents two overarching findings. First, there is a substantial discrepancy between 
the static image of radicalization and violent extremism often presented in policy and the 
complexities practitioners experience when they address these phenomena across extremist 
milieus. Secondly, the three targeted milieus differ in crucial respects: the type and level of 
threats they represent, their core values and other internal characteristics, as well as their 
position vis-à-vis society at large. By focusing on perceived differences between the milieus, 
our analysis has also made evident some of the complex challenges that practitioners face 
during their PRVE work in local contexts.  
While we have analyzed how public servants perceive and respond to RWE, LWE and 
MIE milieus, the question of how these differences can be conceptualized remains 
unattended. Summing up the ways in which practitioners perceive the targeted milieus enables 
us to draw a general model of three key continuums, or dimensions, along which extremist 
milieus might differ (see Figure 1 below). Each continuum ranges from high/severe or far on 
the right end, to low/minor or short, on the left end. Positioning the milieus on these 
continuums helps us to clarify why local practitioners relate and respond differently to them, 
while also providing an aggregated image of the experienced key differences across the 
milieus.8 We argue that this multi-dimensional model has a broader application for 
understanding how practitioners (or other actors) relate and respond to extremism(s). It can, 
for example, be used for other milieus or groups that are labeled as violent extremists or in 
other spatial or temporal contexts where the placement of the milieus in question might differ 
substantially from the Swedish context we have examined. 
 
 
8 The placement of each milieu in Figure 1 reflects the practitioners’ perceptions at the time of the interviews 
(2016-2018). Since then, the targeted milieus and organizations might have changed, as well as the ways in 
which they are perceived. For recent studies and reports on each milieu, see CVE (2020a, 2020b, 2020c), 
Ranstorp & Ahlin (2020), Jämte, Lundstedt & Wennerhag (2020), Rostami et al. (2018) and the Swedish security 
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The first dimension (level of political violence) concerns the type of threats associated with 
each milieu, and thus reflects the perceived severity of the violent actions or tactics. In our 
case, the continuum ranges from lethal terrorist attacks and threats to national security 
(severe), to violence against individuals and threats to local democratic institutions (medium), 
to issues related to property damage and disturbance of public order (minor). The second 
dimension (prevalence of threat) encompasses the level of threat associated with different 
extremist milieus, and thus the extent and intensity of their activities. The placement on this 
dimension is often based on the public visibility of the milieus and the number of attacks, 
actions or public protest events they stage. The third dimension (distance to mainstream 
values) sets out the degree to which the core values of each milieu are seen to resonate with 
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corresponds with the level of social sanction and exclusion that those (previously) involved in 
each milieu face from mainstream society, where a short distance to widely shared values 
involves a low level of social stigmatization. 
Based on what the local practitioners said, we have situated the three milieus on the 
continuums of each dimension (Figure 1). The LWE milieu is situated towards the left end of 
all three dimensions. Regarding the other two milieus, for the first (level of political violence) 
and third (distance to mainstream values) dimensions, the MIE milieu is positioned at the 
outer right end and the RWE milieu between the middle and outer right. The only variation to 
this pattern is the second dimension (prevalence of threat), where RWE is positioned towards 
the outer right end and MIE between the middle and outer right. This positioning reflects the 
fact that practitioners often described the prevalence and activity of RWE as representing a 
higher level of local threat than that of other milieus. Positioning each milieu along these 
three continuums is, of course, a simplification of a more complex reality, but it makes visible 
and helps clarify why local practitioners relate and respond differently to the milieus. While 
our emphasis lies on the experiences of local practitioners, our analysis also showed that those 
experiences may differ from those of other actors (e.g. policy makers, security services, etc.). 
This underlines the fact that different agents may understand and experience the milieus 
differently, which potentially can create friction and affect policy implementation. In our 
study, this is clearly reflected in the lack of attention and responses towards LWE, as well as 
the discord between the experienced extra-local prioritization of MIE and practitioners’ 
expressed need for local work against RWE.  
We argue that this study’s unique inclusion of practitioners’ experiences with LWE 
has contributed to making the differences between the three milieus particularly evident. This 
is because the LWE milieu is seen to differ in important respects from both the RWE and MIE 
milieus, as shown in Figure 1. Attending these contrasting types of milieus, we argue, offers 
important insights. The fact that people who are seen as well integrated into society and not 
socially vulnerable also engage in militant milieus challenges the simplistic picture of “violent 
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risk-indicators or push-and-pull factors. Our analysis also illustrates the broader point that 
PRVE work often seems based on the basic assumption that it is possible to make a clear 
distinction between “normality” and what is seen to represent the “extreme”. This seems more 
easily done in relation to some milieus than others. When the values of members of militant 
milieus align more closely with that of mainstream society, it is more challenging and makes 
less sense to try to identify signs of cognitive radicalization, as their ideas do not necessarily 
stand out as much as within milieus that hold fundamentally anti-democratic or anti-
egalitarian values. This said, the challenge of identifying radicalization in RWE is changing, 
as several values previously associated with the extreme right are seen to become more 
mainstream, such as hostility and negative attitudes towards migration and immigrants. These 
points further underline the contingency of the phenomena of radicalization and the 
fundamental challenge of using a simplistic understanding of it and its indicators as a guide in 
local PRVE work. 
The values and practices associated with each milieu also affect how practitioners 
think and reason about the possibility and necessity of different counter-measures. In the 
literature on PRVE, a distinction is made between de-radicalization and disengagement 
(Lindekilde, 2016; Schmid, 2013), where de-radicalization involves “an ideological change 
and renouncement of radical beliefs and tactics,” and disengagement involves “a behavioral 
change away from radical activities” (Lindekilde, 2016, p. 251). This means that de-
radicalization processes seek cessation to both politically motivated violence and the political 
or religious ideas that underlie them. Disengagement does not involve changing beliefs, but 
rather the detachment from individuals, groups and contexts involved in politically motivated 
violence. As pointed out in several studies, de-radicalization and disengagement do not 
necessarily coincide, as individuals can disengage without being de-radicalized (Bjorgo & 
Horgan, 2009; Horgan, 2009). In relation to these two types of approaches to PRVE, our 
analysis has shown that local practitioners relate differently to the three milieus and that this is 
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When practitioners discussed counter-measures against LWE, they focused primarily 
on behavioral change, not cognitive change. It was the violent practices that were considered 
problematic not the radical beliefs themselves. It was thus considered necessary for 
individuals engaged in politically motivated left-wing violence to disengage, which, 
according to interviewees, often took place naturally as activists grew older. Regarding RWE 
and MIE, both beliefs and practices were deemed problematic and dangerous. The counter-
measures highlighted by practitioners thus often involved the individual disengaging from 
their social context as well as changing behaviors and ideational beliefs. These de-
radicalization efforts were seen to take up more resources, as they often entailed helping the 
individual to a new life, including finding a job or housing, social care, and pursuing 
education. While examples of how this works in relation to MIE are scarce in our empirical 
material, the practitioners often referred to a long tradition of working with RWE through 
specific de-radicalization (so-called “exit”) programs aimed at reintegrating them into society. 
While we have examined practitioners’ views of different extremist milieus and their 
descriptions of their responses to them, there is a substantial lack of independent scientific 
study that follows practitioners’ PRVE work as it plays itself out (see Johansen, 2020 for a 
notable exception). Examining the unfolding of this work directly by combining participant 
observation and interviews of local practitioners could provide valuable in-depth knowledge 
about how this work is practiced on the ground, including decision-making processes, 
initiation of measures, evaluation of and changes to ongoing prevention processes. While this 
type of research would involve challenges concerning ethics, confidentiality and protection of 
the anonymity of targeted individuals, it would make an important contribution to the 
knowledge gap on how PRVE policy is implemented in varied and creative ways by 
practitioners across contexts and professional groups. This kind of research could also provide 
us with deeper insights into the ways in which local practitioners creatively resist, adjust and 
adapt their task of implementing PRVE policy, thus also enabling a more realistic image of 
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